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 I INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), which coincided with an 
increasing interest in optimising behaviour in economics, was a remarkable revolution 
in economic thinking following the Keynesian revolution of a half-century ago. As a 
result, numerous models and policy prescriptions based on the rational expectations 
hypothesis have been developed. Simon (1978) states, economics is not simply the 
study of the allocation of scarce resources, but increasingly the study of the rational 
allocation of scarce resources. As under the doctrine of rationality, expectations form a 
major part of the decision made in an economy. This paper tests to see whether the 
rational expectations hypothesis is the best available objective method for modelling 
the form that such individual expectations take based on the UK data.   
Most previous rationality tests have used aggregated macro data or micro data for short 
sample periods only. However, aggregated data can lead to spurious rejections of 
rationality when agents’ information sets differ
1
, while micro data cannot efficiently 
average out forecast errors over a short time period even if individual forecasts are 
perfectly rational. For example, expectations that might have been rational ex ante, 
may not appear to be so rational ex post, because the sample might have, by chance, 
received some unexpectedly good shocks over the period. As a result, it is important to 
test rationality using micro data on expectations over long sample periods. Keane and 
Runkle (1990) and Bonham and Cohen (2001) argue that unbiased tests for rational 
expectations can only be undertaken using such survey data due to the existence of 
‘micro-heterogeneity’. This leads to a rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis 
with aggregate data even if expectations are rational at the individual level, since 
individuals make their forecasts using different information sets.  
                                                 
1 M. P. Keane, D. E. Runkle 1990 
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The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is unique in containing 12 years’ worth 
of individual and household data, where a great deal of information is known about 
respondents at the point when they make their forecasts. As a result, while twelve years 
might not be long enough, the BHPS allows us to directly identify the types of 
individuals whose expectations are structurally incorrect. Also, I can analyse the 
robustness of the results over time and such a result would be as significant as a 
finding of irrationality, because of the available limited datasets. This paper applies the 
panel facet of the BHPS to test more clearly than usual whether expectations are 
unbiased and efficient. I interpret the results by characterizing the type of shocks that 
hit different types of individuals over time. Such a characterization is of 
methodological interest, because both theoretical and empirical models are generally 
sensitive to the assumptions made about shock processes. In particular, many such 
models assume that “aggregate” shocks affect all respondents uniformly.   
The rational expectations hypothesis does not argue that agents are always right in 
their expectations of future variables. Instead, the expectations error is held to be a 
random variable, which is uncorrelated with the other variables in the process and the 
information set available to the agent. Hence expectations errors are random, have a 
mean value of zero and a variance which is less than that associated with other models 
of forecasting. Thus, on average, rational expectations will be correct because the 
mean value of the expectations error is zero and this also means that rational 
expectation are the most efficient means of forming expectations, because such 
expectations errors have the property of minimum variance. Because of this, this 
chapter tests whether expectation errors are classical, in other words, whether they 
contain systematic components. For instance, over the sample period less educated 
individuals might, on average, have been optimistic about the future, and have received 
disproportionately positive shocks. Chamberlain (1984) and others have specified that 
systematic expectation errors can be a potential problem in estimating any rational 
expectation or forward-looking model using short panel data. This chapter uses direct 
measures of individual expectation errors derived from the BHPS to test this point 
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directly.  
In empirical tests of life cycle models, direct information on respondents’ future 
expectations is rarely used. Conversely this thesis uses the BHPS over the period 
1991~2002 to directly compare survey information on what agents expect with ex post 
measures of what results: information on whether output is expected to increase, 
decrease or remain same over the next year is compared to similar information 
collected twelve months later on what actually happened. At first, this paper explores 
the characteristics of expectation errors, which is done by comparing expected and 
realized financial status changes, to test the rationality of expectations. It then 
investigates how people form their expectations by identifying the factors which 
significantly affect respondents’ subjective attitude concerning their financial 
well-being.  
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II surveys related empirical 
studies. Section III presents the methodology for testing the rational expectations 
hypothesis. Section IV presents the results concerning the rationality of expectations 
by exploring the characteristics of expectations errors and identifies the factors which 
influence respondent’s expectations. Finally, section V presents some concluding 
remarks. 
II RELATED STUDIES 
Numerous empirical studies have been done to support or refute the rational 
expectations hypothesis since Muth published his seminal article (Muth, 1961). For 
example, Mishkin (1983,p.157) presents robust evidence to justify the assumption of 
rational expectations in financial markets and commodity exchanges. However, these 
results only apply to specialised markets and do not mean that the rational expectations 
hypothesis can be seen as the way that expectations are formed across the economy as 
a whole. On the other hand, if no major favourable insights of rational expectations in 
other markets have abounded, those empirical studies that have claimed to disprove the 
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hypothesis have not been technically strong. For example, the Chow Test
2
 has been 
used to test the REH by many economists but often their data fail to be consistent
3
. 
Also, Mullineaux (1978) found that results from the Chow Test were always opposite 
to those from alternative testing methods.  
Maddala, Fishe, and Lahiri (1981), Gramlich (1983) and Batchelor (1986) tested the 
rationality of surveyed inflation expectations using the aggregated Michigan data. 
While these studies analysed quantitative questions about the future path of inflation 
(up/down/no change), the aggregation bias implies these individual rationality tests are 
not straightforward. Batchelor and Jonung (1989) examined micro-level data on 
respondents’ subjective expectations using small Swedish panel data and over a short 
time period (twelve months) and found evidence of bias and inefficiency. Using latent 
variable models, Ivaldi (1992) rejects the hypothesis of rational expectation for the 
French manufacturing industry, while, Nerlove and Schuermann (1995;1997) use a 
similar model along with micro data from a sample of Swiss and UK firms, to reject 
the rational expectations hypothesis. The alternative hypotheses of adaptive and naive 
expectations are also rejected as well in these studies. Das et al. (1999) tested the 
rationality of income expectations using a relatively short Dutch dataset (1984-1988) 
and found that income expectations were on average too low relative to subsequent 
outcomes. However as has already noted, rationality may not to be required to average 
out over the course of only a single year. Indeed, Souleles (2001) argues that even five 
years might be too short a period to allow expectation errors to average out. 
Furthermore, an interest in data derived from various household surveys and modelling 
the expectations of private households or individuals is increasing as economists 
consider decisions on consumption, savings, portfolio choice, investments in durable 
goods, labour supply, job search and fertility in many life cycle models. Guiso et al. 
(1992) and Domintz and Manski (1997) analyse Italian cross-sectional survey data on 
subjective income distributions and find that income uncertainty has a negative impact 
                                                 
2 This uses the F-test to test for structural stability in an econometric model.  
3 For the Chow Test to be accurate the consistency criterion must be met.  
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on the proportion of a households portfolio held in risky assets. Hochguertel (1998) 
finds a similar result for the Netherlands. Alessie and Lusardi (1996) also used 
Netherlands panel data and found that while expected changes in income were 
significantly correlated with actual income changes, they did not find the expected 
negative relationship between savings and the predicted income change. Finally Das 
and Van Soest (1996) also used Dutch survey data to explain the relationship between 
expected income changes and previous income changes and the differences between 
income expectations and outcomes over the same time period. This found that many 
people are pessimistic about their future income prospects. 
Consequently, an unresolved methodological issue raised in the tests of the validity of 
the REH is whether it is appropriate to test it at the micro level. Edward Prescott (1977) 
has argued that expectations are not observed directly, and economists cannot use 
survey data to test the REH. Instead, only some theory incorporating the REH can be 
tested, if it is consistent with observations. On the contrary, a number of economists
4
 
have found that survey data on prediction variables can be of assistance in the 
empirical modelling of economic behaviour and econometric forecasting.  Arnold 
Zellner (1985) supports the use of micro and industry data in examining relationships 
suggested by macroeconomic research, while Herbert Simon (1979) and James Tobin 
(1980) support direct empirical testing of the REH. My own view is that if the survey 
evidence supports the REH, results derived under this assumption will be both more 
interesting and more demanding of serious attention. As a result, it is an appropriate 
and worthwhile activity to directly test the REH in this paper.  
In sum, there are many problems that arise in empirical work concerned with 
expectations. No overall conclusion about whether expectations in the market are 
rational can be obtained from empirical work as it is so imperfect. There is no 
sufficiently strong evidence to completely disprove this hypothesis until it has been 
empirically falsified. Up till now, rational expectations are the best available models 
                                                 
4 Owen Sauerlander (1955); Otto Eckstein, Patricia Mosser, and Michael Cebry (1984) 
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for economists to use to model economic expectations. They are efficient at a statistical 
level because they have an error term with a minimum variance and zero mean. Also 
the REH coincides perfectly with the concept of homo economicus
5
 and of the 
utility-maximising individual. The main point to be made in this section is that the 
REH is not perfect, but it is the best available method that we have for modelling 
expectations if these expectations need to be incorporated into economic models. At 
least, it fits the loose economic criterion of rationality. 
III METHODOLOGY 
Before exploring the characteristics of financial expectations, this paper tests the 
rationality of respondents’ financial forecasts, in particular their unbiasedness and 
efficiency, by analysing the properties of respondents’ expectation errors. The 
approach to empirically investigating their rationality is to examine the determinants of 
the expectations errors between the financial expectation at time t and the 
corresponding outcome at time t+1. These results can also be interpreted as 
characterizing the shocks that, ex post, have hit different types of respondents over 
time because, up until now, in many models such shocks have been generally assumed 
to affect all respondents uniformly.  
Unbiased expectations are those which have the same mean as the actual outcomes. 
There are three ways to test for the unbiasedness of financial expectations. First, many 
researchers assume that individuals have a perceived outcome probability distribution
6
. 
With the help of the assumption that the stated expected category is the modal category, 
or includes the median of the expected outcome distribution, it is possible to compare 
the probability of the outcome being worse than that expected with the probability of it 
turning out to be better than expected in terms of expectation errors. This leads to the 
use of nonparametric sign tests, which are used to test if the probability of falling into 
the single northeast cell significantly differs from the probability of falling into the 
                                                 
5 It is a term used for an approximation or model of homo sapiens that acts to obtain the highest possible well-being 
for himself given available information about opportunities and other constraitns, both natural and institutional, on 
his ability to achieve his predetermined goals.  
6 For example, Das et al., 1999 
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single southwest cell. To use a nonparametric test, the categories 1 and 2 and the 
categories 4 and 5 are combined, and the middle (0’s) responses are dropped by 
merging them into one of the other two responses (+1 or –1). Thus, the 5x5 forecast 
error tables are collapsed into 2x2 tables. The main problem with this is that dropping 
and merging categories may waste a good deal of information and that this approach 
makes it difficult to infer the individual or structural determinants of forecast errors. 
Second, expectation errors are parameterised by seeing their values (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2) as 
cardinal. This means that being two places off the diagonal is twice as bad as being one 
place off. This allows us to summarize the expectation errors by regressing the errors 
on a constant by the use of OLS. However, whichever way this is done means that we 
cannot conclude that respondents are generally over-optimistic or over-pessimistic 
uniformly across time. Alternatively, most previous studies have used time dummies to 
explain all systematic heterogeneity with the strong assumption that shocks hit all 
people uniformly. Instead, this paper only uses the time dummies as independent 
variables in regressions to test for any significant time effects in the expectation errors, 
Fisite , without cardinalizing them, which is suggested by Souleles (2001). The 
following equation (1) is estimated using the year dummies as independent variables.  
ititit vtimedFisite +′= −1
*                         (1) 
Where t (t = 1992,…,2002) refers to the second respondent interview in the BHPS data, 
t-1 to the first interview. *itFisite  denote expectations errors in the wave t. 
Efficiency requires that expectation errors are uncorrelated with any variable in an 
agent’s information set at the time of forecast; otherwise the forecast does not take 
advantage of all the available information. Efficiency is tested by looking for 
systematic demographic components in respondents’ expectation errors. The focus is 
on cross-sectional heterogeneity, because there is such variation available in the BHPS 
data. Specifically, heterogeneity in expectation errors will be analysed by adding the 
demographic variable Z to equation (1) along with the full set of year dummies as 
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follows:  
itittit uZbtimeaFisite +′+′= −− 11
*                       (2) 
where t-1 refers the first respondent interview in the BHPS data and t to the second 
interview. Since the demographic variable 1−itZ  is known to agent i at time t-1 of 
forecast, efficiency requires that 0=′b . Fisite  is restricted to {-2, -1, 0, 1, 2} so the 
estimate is regressed by the random effects order probit model. 
It is noted that, in this paper, we test the REH at the micro level by a presupposition 
that for market expectations to be rational all agents surveyed must be forming rational 
expectations. However, we know that hypothesis is based on the market, on average, 
having rational expectations. Thus, if our empirical test attacks on the REH at the 
micro level, we cannot take the result as absolute and reject the hypothesis. In fact, in 
life cycle models of individual behaviour, future expectations play an important role. 
Thus even if expectations based on every individual are not fully rational, they may 
still help forecast individual behaviour in relation to consumption or saving. This has 
lead to an increasing interest in data on, and the empirical modelling of, individual 
expectations. As a result, this paper also uses direct information on respondents’ future 
financial status change expectations, which is different from the standard approach
7
 
found in the literature of inferring expectations from panel data on outcomes that leads 




This paper used a random effects ordered probit model to investigate the 
characteristics of subjective data by describing the relationship between individual 
financial expectations, explanatory variables such as realized financial changes in the 
past and a set of demographical variables. To see whether different social groups have 
different financial change expectations, it includes various dummy variables. 
                                                 
7 See the discussion in Guiso et al. (1992, 1996), Lusardi (1993), and Alessie & Lusardi(1996). 
8 Identifying the types of individuals who make the largest forecast errors and conversely to identify those 
individuals whose forecasts are the most accurate.  
 9 
Furthermore, it explores in more detail sub-samples differentiated in terms of gender, 
marital status, education level and job status. Since much experimental evidence 
indicates that expectations depend on the status quo, current financial situations are 
excluded from regressions which, instead, involve two dummy variables derived from 
financial outcomes to understand their effects on respondents’ expectation. It is 






*         (3) 
where the index i represents the respondent and index t represents time 
(t=1991,1992……2002). *tFisitx  denotes the financial situation change expectations 
in wave t. itZ  is a k-dimensional vector of background variables reflecting, for 
example, gender, age, the logarithm of real household income, and dummy variables 
for marriage status, smoking, housing wealth, education level, labour market status, 
number of children, household size, and geographic location, etc. −−1itFisitc  and 
+
−1itFisitc  represent the realized financial deterioration and improvement in wave t-1 
respectively. It means that the prediction *itFisitx  given in wave t depends on the 
realized financial change 1−itFisitc  the respondent has experienced during the past 
twelve months. It may also reflect a psychological effect of past financial changes on 
future expectations. This effect should not be present if the assumptions of the rational 
expectation hypothesis are satisfied ( 021 =′=′ γγ ). ia  is an individual effect which is 
assumed to be a random effect, and distributed with mean zero and variance 2aσ . itu  
is an error term and assumed to follow a distribution with a zero mean and variance 
2σ . Year dummies ttime  are included to allow for macro-economic shocks, assumed 
to be common for all respondents, and not varying with itZ , 
−
−1itFisitc  or 
+
−1itFisitc . 
For all the financial questions, larger values of *itFisitx  reflect better states. In the 
preliminary analysis I investigate the effects of background (demographical) variables 
 10 
and realized financial changes in previous time periods on respondents’ expectations of 
financial change over time. 
IV RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This section tests the rationality of expectations and analyzes the properties of 
households’ expectations errors and expectations. To start with, the demographical 
variables in my regression included race. But, after dropping observations with item 
non-response, most of answers to the race question were inapplicable. As a result, race 
was excluded from the demographical variables considered. As a result, the following 
analysis controls for the following individual and household characteristics: age, real 
household income, marital status, gender, smoking behaviour, housing wealth, 
educational attainment, employment status, number of children, household size, and 
geographical region.  
Expectations Rationality Tests 
We start by testing the unbiasedness of financial change expectations. To do this 
equation (1) was estimated for the whole sample and for various sub-samples based on 
both the unbalanced and balanced database. Because the results from both databases 
are similar, we report the one based on the unbalanced database. The resulting 
coefficients and standard deviations for the whole sample and different demographic 
groups are graphed in Figures in Appendix A. For discrete expectations errors the 
chi-squared tests implied that the year dummies were jointly significant, suggesting 
there is significant variation in respondents’ financial expectations errors from year to 
year, except the model in the case of ‘others’ in the education sub-sample. Regression 
results controlling for time effects were, therefore, reported in all instances except the 
‘others’ case. Financial change expectations errors are found to be consistently positive 
throughout the 12 years for the whole sample, suggesting that people were 
continuously and positively surprised over the period. In short, the respondents’ 
financial expectations appear to be significantly biased. The coefficient of 
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cross-correlation ρ  is strongly significant across samples, suggesting there is 
significant heterogeneity effect. That is, respondent expectations errors appear to be 
biased. But, it requires many years, even decades, to distinguish whether they are 
biased ex ante, or just ex post. The bias is problematic for empirical studies with short 
sample period in either case. In particular, individual expectations have 
higher-frequency systematic patterns in expectations errors.   
Turning to the efficiency of financial change expectations, I used equation (2) to 
estimate the results based on the unbalanced sample. These are shown in Table 1 in 
Appendix B. The pseudo 2R s are small, implying that expectation errors are largely 
unsystematic. However, the demographic variables are jointly significant according to 
the chi-squared statistics, which is counter to the assumption of efficiency. The errors 
tended to be especially positive on average among those on high incomes, in paid 
employment, married couples, female-headed households and those with no children. 
They were also more positive among those living in East Anglia, Yorkshire or the 
North. However, the errors were more negative among older respondents, smokers, 
and those purchasing their house on a mortgage. While the overall average 
expectations error was negative in the preliminary analysis, the bias in financial status 
change expectation tended to increase with some demographic variable like age, 
number of children, and unemployment status.  
In summary, while this analysis of the deviation between financial expectations and 
outcomes suggests that the assumption on rational expectations or absence of 
macro-economic shocks are invalid, whether this can be interpreted as evidence of 
“irrationality” is a subtle issue. Because we assume that time dummies capture all 
systematic components of forecast errors, the results can be interpreted by the ex post 
shocks. It could be that the young, those on low incomes, smokers, those paying a 
mortgage, the unemployed, and parents, have perfectly rational expectations ex ante, 
but ex post have received disproportionately more bad or good shocks over the sample 
period. This is consistent with the literature that finds evidence of increasing inequality 
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over the period, in part due to skill-biased technical change
9
. But the assumption in 
empirical studies that time dummies capture all systematic components of forecast 
errors makes the ex post interpretation of the results problematic. The inefficiency of 
financial expectations is hard to explain and more likely represents ex ante 
inefficiency.  
Financial Expectations 
This part presents the relationships between financial change expectations and the 
subsequent financial change outcomes. It uses a random effects ordered probit model 
to investigate the characteristics of subjective data by describing the relationship 
between an individual’s financial expectation and explanatory variables including past 
realized financial changes and a set of demographical variables. To see whether 
different social groups have different financial change expectations, it also included 
various dummy variables. Furthermore, it explored various sub-samples based on 
gender, marital status, educational attainment and job status. Since much experimental 
evidence indicates that expectations depend heavily on the status quo, the current 
financial situation is excluded in the regressions, which instead use two dummy 
variables derived from past financial outcomes to understand their effects on 
respondents’ expectation. The results are shown in Table 3 of Appendix B, which 
presents the effects of realized financial improvements or deteriorations on individual’s 
financial change expectations. The total number of observations in the sample is 72921. 
No restrictions were imposed upon the slope coefficients across the various waves. 
The relationship between financial change expectations and background variables is 
set out in Table 3 (Appendix B). The effect of Deteriorated (-0.21) is significantly 
negative and the effect of Improved (0.36) is significantly positive for the whole 
sample. It implies that those who experience financial change deterioration in the past 
have a higher probability of expecting further financial change deterioration than 
others. On the other hand, those who experience financial change improvements tend 
                                                 
9 Cutler and Katz (1991); Attanasio and Davis (1996) 
 13 
to have higher expectations for their financial change. In other words, it means that 
expected financial changes can be predicted with some certainty by previous financial 
change outcomes. However, because the magnitude of the effect of being better off is 
over two times greater than being worse off, there seems to be a persistent asymmetry 
in how individuals evaluate the effect of financial gains and losses on their future 
financial well-being. People are likely to have higher expectations when their situation 
improves, and refuse to expect worse outcome even when they had become worse off 
in the past. This result can be potentially helpful to explain loss aversion in economic 
behaviour if expectation affects consumers’ choice.  
The results from the sub-samples are also presented in Table 3 in Appendix B. It shows 
that men’s expectations are more sensitive to both improvements (0.32 v 0.30) and 
deteriorations (-0.10 v -0.05) than those of women. It means the past experience 
impacts more on male respondents. In addition, the magnitude of the effect of realized 
improvements and deteriorations on the subject’s expectation is not symmetric either. 
Similarly, the realized changes influence the expectations of the married and the 
highly-educated respondents more than those of the unmarried, and those with only a 
secondary education level, respectively. In other words, married people, or the highly 
educated, were more sensitive to realized financial changes. In addition, the realized 
improvement has a greater effect on expectations than realized deteriorations in both 
cases. It is noted that realized deteriorations do not influence the expectations of the 
respondents with secondary education level. In other words, there is no difference 
between realized deterioration and realized non-change when individuals with 
secondary education level form their expectations. The asymmetry of response is more 
evident when I consider the schooling effect.  
Generally speaking, the family has been the traditional source of protection against the 
economic consequences of uncertain events. This is because the economics literature 
has demonstrated that marriage partners can be made strictly better-off, provided their 
incomes are not perfectly correlated. However the above analysis shows exactly the 
opposite: being married was associated with a lower expectations comparing to those 
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of the unmarried. The effect (-0.10) is statistically significant using a t-test. This result 
may be explained by the extent to which families depend on market conditions. In 
countries with developed welfare systems, providing good medical or unemployment 
insurance, one does not need to rely on one’s spouse to enjoy increasing returns or to 
pool risks. Furthermore, establishing a new household involves considerable start-up 
costs (for the ceremony itself, the purchase or rental of a new house, furniture, 
household equipment, etc.), while the maintenance cost of a new household may in the 
early years be higher than those borne by the two families of origin. On the other hand, 
it could also explain why the unmarried decrease their expectations more as they age 
relative to the married. This should have been the case in UK. The gap in expectations 
between the married and the unmarried among the higher-educated group (-0.08) is 
less than among the secondary-educated group (-0.12). This means the 
secondary-educated are more sensitive to changes in their marital status, and lower 
their expectation more than the highly educated after they get married. Also, the gap in 
expectations between women and men among the married group is less than the gap 
among those in the unmarried group. The possible explanation is that marriage does 
make women feel a bit more dependant over their future.  
Females tended to have lower expectations than males: the coefficient for women 
(-0.06) was negative and significant. This result is similar to that found by Barskey et 
al. (1997) and Donkers et al. (1999). At a deeper level, there may be biological reasons, 
with women’s position in procreation relative to men’s requiring them to be more risk 
averse. An explanation for why females are more prudent may be because they dispose 
of ‘household income’ rather than their ‘own income’. We could use working female in 
future regressions instead simply their gender in further investigations. If the 
explanation of females being more risk averse is because they do not work, it would be 
expected that the coefficient of working female would be significantly different from 
the coefficient of simply being female. If this were not the case, it would suggest that 
female risk aversion is not related to having no income of their own. However, the 
results present that there is not significant difference between highly educated women 
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and highly educated men when they make their expectations.  
Although the above results show higher education gives women more confidence in 
the process of forecasting their future, there is no significant difference between the 
highly educated and those with secondary education level in the samples.   
Age is generally used as a proxy for unobserved social status, health and cohort effects. 
The analysis found that age had a small negative effect (-0.041) on financial change 
expectations. Individual expectations decrease as their age increases. There are a 
number of potential explanations for this: that the old are not happy the longer they 
live; the old feel less in control of their environment; or have lower aspirations, which 
are hence easier to meet (A. Cambell et al. 1976). The coefficients of age were 
significantly different between the married (-0.036) and the unmarried (-0.051). This 
suggests that although the married have lower expectations at a point in time relative to 
the unmarried, the unmarried were more likely to lower their expectations more 
quickly than the married with increasing age. Similarly, considering the schooling 
effect, highly educated people decreased their expectations with age more quickly than 
people of the secondary education level.  
The results found significant negative effects for real household incomes (-0.03) on 
individual expectation, as might have been expected, in either the whole sample or 
some of the sub-samples. The negative coefficient means that, for such people, the 
higher their household income in the past 12 months, the worse the financial situation 
expected in the coming year. Furthermore, when a variable to capture income variance 
was included in the regressions, its coefficient was significantly positive in all cases, 
although very small. This result conflicts with the general idea that those with higher 
‘permanent’ incomes are, on average, more likely to be optimistic than others.   
There is a strong positive relationship between being a smoker and an individual’s 
expectations. If smoking is viewed as a proxy for risk-aversion, smokers might be 
considered to be risk-lovers who have higher expectations. Another explanation is that 
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smoking alleviates the smokers’ stress and this leads them to have higher expectations 
of the future than non-smokers. In the gender sub-sample, although the female have 
lower expectations in the whole sample, smoking behaviour pushes their expectations 
much more than the male. In other words, smoking behaviour can diminish the gap in 
expectation between the female and the male. Also, smoking leads a diminishing gap 
between the married and the unmarried. For highly educated smokers, they have lower 
expectations relative to those with secondary education level.   
Housing wealth had a significant effect on individual’s expectation or respondents 
owning their own home had significantly lower expectation than non-owner, while 
respondents with a mortgage had the highest expectations than all others in the whole 
sample. The possible explanation is that respondents with a mortgage are confident of 
their improved future financial well-being and consequently prefer take out mortgage 
to support their housing. However, the secondary educated with a rent have higher 
expectations relative to others.  
Five types of labour supply status were considered in the analysis: paid employment, 
self-employment, unemployment, retired, and various forms of economic inactivity. 
The unemployed were the most optimistic in their expectations, while the retired had 
the lowest expectation. This conflicts with the view that the unemployed have to 
persistently lower their expectations because of the strong causal relationship between 
past and current unemployment shown by Arulampalam et al. (2000). One explanation 
for this is that it reflects their higher expected chances of finding a job due to an 
upswing of the business cycle. The unmarried and the secondary-educated exhibited a 
greater attachment to being unemployed than the married and the highly educated 
respectively, related who tended to be in employment.  
There is considerable evidence of a strong negative correlation between household size 
and income per person in developing countries. As a result, it is often concluded that 
people living in larger and (generally) younger households are typically poorer. The 
poor also tend to devote a higher share of their budget to essential goods. But because 
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certain goods (water taps, cooking utensils, firewood, clothing and housing) allow for 
the possibility of sharing or bulk purchase, i.e. economies of scale, the cost per person 
of a given standard of living is lower when individuals live together than apart. In this 
analysis, individuals living in medium-sized households had higher expectations 
compared to those in smaller and larger households, while those in the smallest 
households had the lowest expectations. However it is interesting to note that the 
unmarried living in large households had lower expectations than others, while the 
married living in large households had the highest expectations in similar 
circumstances. One reason for this is that the unmarried focus on the household’s costs, 
while the married focus on the emotional aspects of family life. Female respondents 
lower their expectations more than male if their household size changes from medium 
to small. Conversely, if their household size changes from medium to large, the female 
lower less, relative to the male. Considering the previous results, we found that the 
female usually have lower expectations, which indicates that the female also take into 
account the emotional aspects of family life, and large household size can increase 
their expectations. There did not appear to be significant difference in expectations by 
household size for respondents with only a secondary level education.  
Similarly, this analysis found that respondents with two children were the most 
optimistic in the whole sample and sub-samples. One explanation for this is that the 
subsidy from government is the same or greater than the family costs for two children. 
In terms of marital status, the unmarried people with more than two children had the 
lowest expectations. It was not significantly different for their expectations if the 
number of children was not more than two. Interestingly, the birth of the first baby will 
lower the expectations of the secondary-educated, but after the first born, more 
children make their expectations recover, and then have no further positive influence 
thereafter. In all cases, parents with two children had the highest expectations.  
Properties of Financial Expectations Errors 
The previous part explained why different social groups have different financial 
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expectations, and showed who have higher or lower expectations. This part identifies 
who were rational, and who usually made mistakes in forecasting their future, by 
analysing the characteristics of financial expectation errors in more details. This is 
important to aid our understanding of the ability of respondents to foresee and adjust to 
impending financial status changes. We added financial change outcomes in the wave 
t-1 into equation (2) in line with the regression of financial expectations. Table 2 in 
Appendix B shows that most independent variables are significant at the 95% 
confidence level. The coefficients of financial change outcome come in with the 
expected sign in the samples. This suggests that financial outcomes have a strongly 
positive relationship with respondents’ expectation errors. Individuals significantly 
overestimate their expectations when they realize that their financial position has 
worsened over the past 12 months, while those whose financial situation has improved 
have a larger probability of underestimating future increases than others. Relating to 
the coefficients of expectations in the previous section, we find that even the realized 
improvement increases respondents’ expectations but the actual improvement is still 
underestimated. Similarly, the actual deterioration is greater than respondents expect 
when they have experienced deterioration. In short, the magnitude of improvement and 
deterioration are both underestimated. Further, the magnitude of this effect is also 
significantly asymmetric: the magnitude of the negative effect of Deteriorated (-0.21) 
is significantly less than that of the positive effect of Improved (0.31). The most 
plausible explanation of this is that those respondents whose financial situation have 
deteriorated are either too optimistic about the future, or are more likely to view these 
negative financial changes as temporary.  
Furthermore, the demographic variables are also economically significant. For instance, 
the expectations errors are about 4.7 percentage point larger (more positive) for 
married respondents, relative to the unmarried. Similarly, the errors are about 9.4 
percentage points larger for female, relative to male. As a result, married women (0.07) 
were more pessimistic than married men (0.05) in this analysis, because the magnitude 
of expectations, which men (-0.13) and women (-0.12), decrease, were nearly same 
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relative to the unmarried. In terms of education sub-samples, the married, or women 
with a secondary education level, appeared more pessimistic than unmarried, because 
they had lower expectations. The interesting point is that the highly educated married 
have lower expectations than the unmarried, but they do not appear more optimistic or 
pessimistic. Also, the highly educated women and men have the same expectations, but 
women were found to be more pessimistic than men. At the same time, there is no 
significant difference across education level in the whole sample. 
The coefficient of age becomes insignificant in expectations errors regression, while it 
is significantly negative in expectations regression. It means that although respondents’ 
expectations decrease with their age, the change in their age will not influence their 
ability to make expectations.  
Smokers are more optimistic than non-smokers in all samples, and this result could be 
consistent with the view that smokers are considered as risk-lovers. Smokers with only 
secondary level education are more optimistic than those who were highly educated. 
Smoking behaviour can be considered as an important factor indicating individual’s 
optimism.  
Respondents who rent are more pessimistic relative to both those owning their own 
home, or non-owners, in the whole sample, although they have higher expectations 
than home owners. In other words, they usually receive more ex post good shocks, or 
have lower ex ante expectations relative to others. Further, the actual financial 
improvement of home owners is less than others; since home owners have the same 
expectations errors as respondents with a mortgage, while they have the lowest 
expectations. However, the secondary educated with a mortgage are more optimistic 
than those who rent, even though they have lower expectations than the latter. The 
unemployed have highest expectations, and are the most optimistic, while the 
in-paid-employment sample members were the most pessimistic. This result is 
consistent in all samples. As a result, unemployment can also be considered to be an 
important factor indicating over-optimism.   
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In relation to the number of children, one child is jointly significantly negative. This 
means that respondents with only one child are more optimistic than others, although 
respondents with two children have higher expectations. But women with two children 
appear more optimistic than other women, because they have obviously higher 
expectations. Another exception is the secondary-educated with two children, who are 
the most optimistic.  
In the whole sample, there are no significant differences of forecast errors among 
respondents living in different-sized households, even people living in small 
households have lower expectations. In the female sub-sample, respondents in medium 
household size appeared more optimistic than those in other household size. Men, and 
the unmarried in big households, appear more pessimistic  
The differences between regions are not significant in the whole sample, except that 
people living in East Anglia and Yorkshire are more pessimistic than those in other 
regions. Considering male sub-samples, there is no region appearing more pessimistic 
or optimistic than the others. But, for female, women living in Wales and Scotland are 
more optimistic than those living in other regions. Similarly, the unmarried living in 
the Southeast, and Yorkshire, are more optimistic.  
V CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzed this direct subjective data on financial expectations and compared 
them to the outcomes using the BHPS covering the period 1991-2003. Its main 
findings are as follows. First, the number of people overestimating future financial 
changes is larger than the number of people underestimating them. This suggests that 
people’s expectations are not rational, as agents whose financial situation has 
deteriorated are systematically too optimistic, or view negative financial changes as 
temporary. Second, those people whose financial situation has improved in the past 
tend to be more sensitive than those whose financial position change has deteriorated. 
This result, potentially, can explain the asymmetric nature of consumers’ behaviour in 
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terms of loss aversion in the consumption literature. Thirdly, the expectations of men, 
the married, and those with only a secondary level education, are more sensitive to 
their financial outcomes than others. Fourth, with respect to expectations, there are no 
significant relationships between real household incomes and an individual’s 
expectations. The married are more pessimistic than the unmarried, but marriage can 
alleviate people’s pessimism over the time scale, or make women and smokers more 
optimistic. However women and the highly educated individuals generally have 
comparatively lower expectations, while individuals living in medium sized 
households, or those renting accommodation, with two children, or who are currently 
unemployed, have relatively higher expectations than the others. Fifth, comparing the 
expected and realized financial outcomes over the same time period suggests that the 
married, women, the paid employed, and people living in smaller households, are more 
pessimistic than others, whilst smokers and the unemployed are over-optimistic. In 
addition, individuals with only one child find it easier to be over-optimistic generally, 






























































































































































































































































































































































 Balanced: #obs = 6265, LR Chi2(10) = 31.64 
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Appendix B 
Table 1 Financial Expectations Errors Regression 
Dependent Variable = Fisite (BHPS: 1991~2002)  
  Whole Sample  Male  Female  Married  Unmarried 
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. 
Age 44.88 -0.0088* -5.080 44.88 -0.0201* -12.290 43.81 -0.0219* -13.970 48.89 -0.004 -1.400 40.25 -0.010* -4.000 
AgeAge/100 23.63 0.0125* 7.160 23.63 0.0224* 12.710 22.90 0.0241* 14.310 26.08 0.0076* 2.580 20.81 0.0135* 5.610 
Log of Income 71.95 0.1388* 22.040 3.89 0.0761* 14.120 3.64 0.0738* 13.860 4.05 0.1342* 16.330 3.59 0.1741* 15.780 
Income Varance - 0.0000* -2.500 - 0.0000* -2.450 - 0.0000 -0.710 - 0.0000 -1.920 - 0.0000 -0.930 
No married 0.46 - - 0.46 - - 0.52 - - -- - - -- - - 
Married 0.54 0.0838* 6.330 0.54 0.0703* 5.340 0.48 0.1159* 9.040 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Male 0.50 - - 0.50 - - - - - 0.53 - - 0.47 - - 
Female 0.50 0.1180* 12.460 0.50 - - - - - 0.47 0.1539* 11.860 0.53 0.0524* 3.390 
No Smoker 0.71 - - 0.71 - - 0.70 - - 0.75 - - 0.66 - - 
Smokers 0.29 -0.0886* -8.540 0.29 -0.1060* -10.490 0.30 -0.1005* -9.760 0.25 -0.0805* -5.840 0.34 -0.0887* -5.380 
Housing Owned 0.24 - - 0.24 - - 0.23 - - 0.26 - - 0.21 - - 
Housing Mortgage 0.48 -0.0385* -3.070 0.48 -0.0039 -0.310 0.47 -0.0001 0.000 0.55 -0.0406* -2.490 0.40 -0.0321 -1.530 
Housing Rented 0.28 -0.0164 -1.220 0.28 -0.0759* -5.540 0.30 -0.0702* -5.200 0.18 -0.0119 -0.620 0.39 -0.0089 -0.450 
Secondary Education 0.02 0.0527 1.740 0.02 0.1058* 3.640 0.02 0.0308 0.940 0.02 0.0447 1.160 0.02 0.0810 1.560 
Higher Education 0.33 - - 0.33 - - 0.32 - - 0.48 - - 0.48 - - 
Others 0.65 -0.0155 -1.510 0.65 0.0054 0.550 0.67 -0.0019 -0.180 0.67 -0.0313* -2.390 0.63 0.0184 1.060 
In Paid employed 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.59 - - 0.49 - - 
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Self employment 0.08 -0.1150* -6.950 0.08 -0.0862* -5.330 0.05 -0.0950* -4.610 0.10 -0.1220* -6.160 0.05 -0.0803* -2.490 
Unemployed 0.05 -0.3710* -14.320 0.05 -0.3815* -16.860 0.04 -0.3961* -15.400 0.03 -0.2630* -6.750 0.07 -0.4388* -12.020 
Retired 0.21 -0.0611* -3.200 0.21 -0.0558* -2.670 0.21 -0.0478* -2.320 0.22 -0.0734* -3.100 0.21 -0.0002 -0.010 
Others 0.13 -0.0224 -1.140 0.13 0.1669* 10.050 0.15 0.1430* 8.700 0.07 -0.0822* -3.060 0.19 0.0759* 2.520 
No Child 0.74 - - 0.74 - - 0.75 - - 0.62 - - 0.88 - - 
1 Child 0.11 -0.0818* -5.560 0.11 -0.0894* -6.000 0.11 -0.0707* -4.810 0.15 -0.0778* -4.240 0.07 -0.0761* -2.480 
2 Children 0.11 -0.0738* -4.790 0.11 -0.0973* -6.150 0.10 -0.0897* -5.490 0.16 -0.0848* -4.560 0.04 -0.0681 -1.750 
3+ Children 0.04 -0.0858* -3.730 0.04 -0.0913* -4.020 0.04 -0.1113* -4.410 0.07 -0.1079* -4.180 0.01 -0.0126 -0.160 
Small HH Size 0.17 -0.0259 -1.630 0.17 0.0198 1.220 0.18 0.0212 1.360 0.01 0.0317 0.370 0.36 -0.0209 -1.120 
Medium HH Size 0.53 - - 0.53 - - 0.51 - - 0.73 - - 0.30 - - 
Big HH Size 0.30 -0.0042 -0.380 0.30 0.0393* 3.620 0.31 0.0289* 2.580 0.26 -0.0460* -3.320 0.34 0.0712* 3.180 
London 0.08 0.0103 0.590 0.08 -0.0346 -1.790 0.07 -0.0196 -1.000 0.07 0.0035 0.150 0.09 0.0294 1.060 
Southeast 0.20 - - 0.20 - - 0.21 - - 0.16 - - 0.15 - - 
Southwest 0.07 0.0104 0.600 0.07 0.0119 0.630 0.06 -0.0247 -1.250 0.08 -0.0224 -1.020 0.07 0.0762* 2.570 
East Anglia 0.03 0.0607* 2.620 0.03 0.0385 1.490 0.03 0.0407 1.500 0.04 0.0673* 2.360 0.03 0.0840* 2.020 
Midlands 0.14 0.0272 1.870 0.14 -0.0089 -0.580 0.13 -0.0208 -1.320 0.14 0.0153 0.840 0.14 0.0592* 2.360 
Yorkshires 0.08 0.0462* 2.690 0.08 0.0145 0.760 0.07 0.0010 0.050 0.08 0.0618* 2.860 0.07 0.0352 1.180 
Wales 0.11 0.0162 0.760 0.11 -0.0197 -1.210 0.13 -0.0620* -3.790 0.11 -0.0259 -0.940 0.11 0.0936* 2.700 
Scotland 0.14 0.0266 1.490 0.14 0.0072 0.470 0.17 -0.0404* -2.700 0.14 0.0066 0.290 0.15 0.0711* 2.430 
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0352 1.460 0.03 -0.0287 -1.080 0.03 -0.0211 -0.810 0.03 0.0144 0.460 0.04 0.1055* 2.730 
North 0.11 0.0349* 2.240 0.11 -0.0010 -0.060 0.09 0.0037 0.220 0.11 0.0126 0.640 0.10 0.0851* 3.190 
LR chi2(39)=  1837.3 LR chi2(38)= 1616.93   1383.88   938.23   928.08  
Pseudo R2  0.012 Pseudo R2 0.0105   0.0093   0.0101   0.0168  
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Dependent Variable = Fisite (BHPS: 1991~2002)  
  Secondary Edu.  High Education  Others   
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. . . . 
Age 38.04 -0.0087* -2.480 48.17 -0.0053* -2.500 42.32 0.0124 0.750 -- -- -- 
AgeAge/100 16.75 0.0098* 2.520 26.99 0.0107* 5.190 19.71 -0.0209 -1.240 -- -- -- 
Log of Income 4.12 0.1794* 16.690 3.67 0.1092* 13.250 4.68 0.2369* 5.440 -- -- -- 
Income Variance - 0.0000* -3.140 - 0.0000* -2.630 - 0.0000 1.680 -- -- -- 
No married 0.49 - - 0.45 - - 0.40 - - -- -- -- 
Married 0.51 0.1171* 5.130 0.55 0.0560* 3.340 0.60 0.0754 0.820 -- -- -- 
Male 0.57 - - 0.48 - - 0.61 - - -- -- -- 
Female 0.43 0.1417* 8.680 0.52 0.1010* 8.380 0.39 -0.0099 -0.150 -- -- -- 
No Smoker 0.76 - - 0.68 - - 0.87 - - -- -- -- 
Smokers 0.24 -0.1006* -5.130 0.32 -0.0839* -6.750 0.13 0.0222 0.200 -- -- -- 
Housing Owned 0.19 - - 0.27   0.19 - - -- -- -- 
Housing Mortgage 0.60 -0.0828* -3.500 0.42 -0.0249 -1.620 0.66 -0.2905* -2.910 -- -- -- 
Housing Rented 0.21 -0.0941* -3.150 0.32 0.0012 0.080 0.14 -0.3575* -2.700 -- -- -- 
Secondary Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Higher Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Others -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
In Paid employed 0.66 - - 0.48 - - 0.75 - - -- -- -- 
Self employment 0.09 -0.0897* -3.350 0.07 -0.1034* -4.760 0.09 -0.2659* -2.350 -- -- -- 
Unemployed 0.03 -0.4689* -9.400 0.05 -0.3443* -11.060 0.03 -0.0553 -0.220 -- -- -- 
Retired 0.09 -0.0697 -1.710 0.27 -0.0873* -3.950 0.08 0.1927 1.090 -- -- -- 
Others 0.13 0.0426 1.170 0.13 -0.0781* -3.250 0.05 0.3375* 2.120 -- -- -- 
No Child 0.71 - - 0.76 - - 0.67 - - -- -- -- 
1 Child 0.13 -0.0816* -3.390 0.10 -0.0716* -3.690 0.15 -0.2766* -3.060 -- -- -- 
2 Children 0.12 -0.1205* -4.880 0.10 -0.0349 -1.680 0.13 -0.1266 -1.300 -- -- -- 
3+ Children 0.04 -0.1192* -2.950 0.04 -0.0460 -1.580 0.04 -0.3319* -2.090 -- -- -- 
Small HH Size 0.14 -0.0159 -0.580 0.18 -0.0369 -1.840 0.17 -0.0658 -0.620 -- -- -- 
Medium HH Size 0.56 - - 0.51 - - 0.65 - - -- -- -- 
Big HH Size 0.30 0.0079 0.400 0.30 -0.0103 -0.740 0.18 0.0677 0.770 -- -- -- 
London 0.09 0.0279 0.960 0.07 0.0056 0.240 0.16 -0.0800 -0.810 -- -- -- 
Southeast 0.21 - - 0.20 - - 0.24 - - -- -- -- 
Southwest 0.06 0.0449 1.390 0.08 0.0053 0.250 0.05 -0.0717 -0.570 -- -- -- 
East Anglia 0.03 0.0725 1.750 0.03 0.0584* 2.070 0.02 0.1468 0.410 -- -- -- 
Midlands 0.13 0.0340 1.310 0.15 0.0205 1.130 0.12 -0.0104 -0.100 -- -- -- 
Yorkshires 0.07 0.0811* 2.600 0.08 0.0335 1.580 0.07 -0.1483 -1.340 -- -- -- 
Wales 0.10 0.0424 1.180 0.11 0.0128 0.480 0.06 -0.3350 -1.370 -- -- -- 
Scotland 0.18 0.0154 0.540 0.12 0.0265 1.120 0.21 -0.0367 -0.340 -- -- -- 
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0400 0.980 0.03 0.0291 0.960 0.02 0.5027* 1.990 -- -- -- 
North 0.09 0.0085 0.310 0.11 0.0497* 2.580 0.06 -0.1636 -1.290 -- -- -- 
LR chi2(37)=  813  1022.31   115.38    
Pseudo R2  0.0158  0.0106   0.0334    
Number of Obs.  19229   39903   1281     
1) UK CPI for obtaining real income figures in 1991; 2) * = significant at 5%; 3) Year dummies are jointly 
estimated; 4) Null hypothesis: coefficient corresponding to explanatory variable is equal to zero.
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Table 2 Financial Expectations Errors Regression 
Dependent Variable = Fisite (BHPS: 1991~2002) 
  Whole Sample  Male  Female  Married  Unmarried 
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. 
Mea
n Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. 
T-Stat. Mean Coef. 
T-Stat. 
Difficult 0.09 -0.2094* -11.350 0.09 -0.2180* -12.070 0.09 -0.2656* -14.430 0.07 -0.200* -7.690 0.24 -0.234* -8.530 
Getting_by 0.27 - - 0.27 - - 0.27 - - 0.26 - - 0.43 - - 
Comfortable 0.64 0.3091* 29.310 0.64 0.3251* 30.890 0.64 0.3187* 29.800 0.68 0.322* 23.370 0.33 0.279* 16.160 
Age 44.88 -0.0032 -1.820 44.88 -0.0141* -8.530 43.81 -0.0153* -9.690 40.25 -0.002 -0.710 40.25 -0.002 -1.020 
AgeAge/100 23.63 0.0075* 4.260 23.63 0.0169* 9.540 22.90 0.0178* 10.510 20.81 0.0063* 2.130 20.81 0.0067* 2.750 
Log of Income 71.95 0.1064* 16.700 3.89 0.0529* 9.740 3.64 0.0555* 10.370 3.59 0.1000* 12.020 3.59 0.1357* 12.120 
Income Variance - 0.0000* -3.570 - 0.0000* -3.770 - 0.0000 -1.670 - 0.0000* -2.560 - 0.0000 -1.740 
No married 0.46 - - 0.46 - - 0.52 - - -- - - -- - - 
Married 0.54 0.0472* 3.550 0.54 0.0533* 4.030 0.48 0.0773* 6.000 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Male 0.50 - - - - - - - - 0.47 - - 0.47 - - 
Female 0.50 0.0947* 9.950 - - - - - - 0.53 0.1132* 8.660 0.53 0.0573* 3.700 
No Smoker 0.71 - - 0.71 - - 0.70 - - 0.66 - - 0.66 - - 
Smokers 0.29 -0.0555* -5.320 0.29 -0.0649* -6.380 0.30 -0.0608* -5.870 0.34 -0.0494* -3.560 0.34 -0.0538* -3.240 
Housing Owned 0.24 - - 0.24 - - 0.23 - - 0.21 - - 0.21 - - 
Housing Mortgage 0.48 -0.0081 -0.640 0.48 0.0204 1.580 0.47 0.0256* 1.960 0.40 -0.0024 -0.140 0.40 -0.0086 -0.410 
Housing Rented 0.28 0.0475* 3.500 0.28 -0.0074 -0.530 0.30 0.0055 0.400 0.39 0.0659* 3.410 0.39 0.0392* 1.960 
Secondary Education 0.02 0.0495 1.640 0.02 0.0871* 2.990 0.02 0.0156 0.480 0.02 0.0330 0.860 0.02 0.0883 1.700 
Higher Education 0.33 - - 0.33 - - 0.32 - - 0.48 - - 0.48 - - 
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Others 0.65 -0.0024 -0.240 0.65 0.0148 1.510 0.67 0.0093 0.890 0.63 -0.0190 -1.450 0.63 0.0294 1.680 
In Paid employed 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.49 - - 0.49 - - 
Self employment 0.08 -0.1140* -6.880 0.08 -0.0830* -5.120 0.05 -0.0841* -4.070 0.05 -0.1215* -6.130 0.05 -0.0807* -2.500 
Unemployed 0.05 -0.2574* -9.810 0.05 -0.2529* -11.000 0.04 -0.2699* -10.370 0.07 -0.1625* -4.140 0.07 -0.3249* -8.760 
Retired 0.21 -0.0511* -2.670 0.21 -0.0434* -2.070 0.21 -0.0302 -1.470 0.21 -0.0710* -2.990 0.21 0.0094 0.270 
Others 0.13 0.0529* 2.680 0.13 0.2244* 13.430 0.15 0.1992* 12.040 0.19 -0.0033 -0.120 0.19 0.1415* 4.650 
No Child 0.74 - - 0.74 - - 0.75 - - 0.88 - - 0.88 - - 
1 Child 0.11 -0.0472* -3.190 0.11 -0.0561* -3.750 0.11 -0.0415* -2.810 0.07 -0.0499* -2.710 0.07 -0.0349 -1.130 
2 Children 0.11 -0.0286 -1.850 0.11 -0.0535* -3.370 0.10 -0.0501* -3.060 0.04 -0.0419* -2.240 0.04 -0.0250 -0.640 
3+ Children 0.04 -0.0209 -0.900 0.04 -0.0309 -1.360 0.04 -0.0526* -2.080 0.01 -0.0489 -1.880 0.01 0.0840 1.060 
Small HH Size 0.17 -0.0165 -1.030 0.17 0.0283 1.750 0.18 0.0399* 2.560 0.36 0.0922 1.060 0.36 -0.0110 -0.590 
Medium HH Size 0.53 - - 0.53 - - 0.51 - - 0.30 - - 0.30 - - 
Big HH Size 0.30 0.0061 0.550 0.30 0.0498* 4.580 0.31 0.0407* 3.630 0.34 -0.0293* -2.110 0.34 0.0790* 3.520 
London 0.08 0.0136 0.770 0.08 -0.0260 -1.340 0.07 -0.0188 -0.960 0.09 0.0136 0.580 0.09 0.0284 1.030 
Southeast 0.20 - - 0.20 - - 0.21 - - 0.15 - - 0.15 - - 
Southwest 0.07 0.0212 1.210 0.07 0.0321 1.690 0.06 -0.0138 -0.700 0.07 -0.0104 -0.470 0.07 0.0859* 2.890 
East Anglia 0.03 0.0613* 2.650 0.03 0.0444 1.710 0.03 0.0445 1.640 0.03 0.0622* 2.180 0.03 0.0884* 2.120 
Midlands 0.14 0.0174 1.200 0.14 -0.0147 -0.960 0.13 -0.0241 -1.520 0.14 0.0041 0.220 0.14 0.0506* 2.020 
Yorkshires 0.08 0.0361* 2.100 0.08 0.0099 0.520 0.07 -0.0107 -0.560 0.07 0.0477* 2.200 0.07 0.0311 1.040 
Wales 0.11 0.0288 1.360 0.11 -0.0071 -0.430 0.13 -0.0382* -2.320 0.11 -0.0213 -0.770 0.11 0.1104* 3.180 
Scotland 0.14 0.0179 1.000 0.14 0.0040 0.260 0.17 -0.0396* -2.630 0.15 -0.0093 -0.400 0.15 0.0704* 2.400 
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0268 1.110 0.03 -0.0339 -1.270 0.03 -0.0231 -0.880 0.04 0.0075 0.240 0.04 0.0967* 2.500 
North 0.11 0.0195 1.250 0.11 -0.0050 -0.300 0.09 -0.0010 -0.060 0.10 -0.0074 -0.370 0.10 0.0750* 2.800 
LR chi2(41)=  3196.46 LR chi2(40)= 3154.17   2989.96   1739.64   1415.57  
Pseudo R2  0.0209   0.0205   0.0201   0.0188   0.0256  
Number of Obs.  60626   60062   58736   37130   21790  
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Dependent Variable = Fisite (BHPS: 1991~2002)  
  Secondary Edu.  High Education  Others  Consistency 
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat.  Coef. T-Stat. 
Difficult 0.08 -0.2779* -7.82 0.10 -0.1741* -7.91 0.09 -0.2086* -11.32 Fisite_1 -0.06 -10.3500 
Getting_by 0.22   0.30 - - 0.27 - -    
Comfortable 0.71 0.3687* 18.14 0.60 0.2844* 22.64 0.64 0.3106* 29.55 --   
Age 38.04 -0.0036 -1.010 48.17 0.0002 0.090 44.88 -0.0032 -1.850 -- -- -- 
AgeAge/100 16.75 0.0056 1.440 26.99 0.0056* 2.710 23.63 0.0075* 4.300 -- -- -- 
Log of Income 4.12 0.1432* 13.160 3.67 0.0784* 9.410 3.84 0.1073* 17.040 -- -- -- 
Income Variance - 0.0000* -3.870 - 0.0000* -3.470 - 0.0000* -3.420 -- -- -- 
No married 0.49 - - 0.45 - - 0.46 - - -- -- -- 
Married 0.51 0.0733* 3.200 0.55 0.0233 1.380 0.54 0.0464* 3.500 -- -- -- 
Male 0.57 - - 0.48 - - 0.50 - - -- -- -- 
Female 0.43 0.1163* 7.080 0.52 0.0771* 6.370 0.50 0.0944* 9.950 -- -- -- 
No Smoker 0.76 - - 0.68 - - 0.71 - - -- -- -- 
Smokers 0.24 -0.0658* -3.340 0.32 -0.0536* -4.290 0.29 -0.0570* -5.500 -- -- -- 
Housing Owned 0.19 - - 0.27   0.24 - - -- -- -- 
Housing Mortgage 0.60 -0.0557* -2.350 0.42 0.0048 0.310 0.48 -0.0076 -0.600 -- -- -- 
Housing Rented 0.21 -0.0172 -0.570 0.32 0.0573* 3.680 0.28 0.0485* 3.600 -- -- -- 
Secondary Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Higher Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Others -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
In Paid employed 0.66 - - 0.48 - - 0.54 - - -- -- -- 
Self employment 0.09 -0.0833* -3.110 0.07 -0.1071* -4.920 0.08 -0.1141* -6.890 -- -- -- 
Unemployed 0.03 -0.3289* -6.520 0.05 -0.2445* -7.750 0.05 -0.2576* -9.830 -- -- -- 
Retired 0.09 -0.1016* -2.480 0.27 -0.0685* -3.090 0.21 -0.0518* -2.710 -- -- -- 
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Others 0.13 0.1338* 3.630 0.13 -0.0059 -0.240 0.13 0.0515* 2.620 -- -- -- 
No Child 0.71 - - 0.76 - - 0.74 - - -- -- -- 
1 Child 0.13 -0.0307 -1.270 0.10 -0.0446* -2.290 0.11 -0.0475* -3.220 -- -- -- 
2 Children 0.12 -0.0587* -2.360 0.10 0.0034 0.160 0.11 -0.0288 -1.870 -- -- -- 
3+ Children 0.04 -0.0306 -0.750 0.04 0.0114 0.390 0.04 -0.0190 -0.820 -- -- -- 
Small HH Size 0.14 -0.0089 -0.320 0.18 -0.0261 -1.300 0.17 -0.0166 -1.050 -- -- -- 
Medium HH Size 0.56 - - 0.51 - - 0.53 - - -- -- -- 
Big HH Size 0.30 0.0236 1.200 0.30 -0.0009 -0.060 0.30 0.0067 0.610 -- -- -- 
London 0.09 0.0431 1.470 0.07 0.0028 0.120 0.08 0.0143 0.820 -- -- -- 
Southeast 0.21 - - 0.20 - - 0.20 - - -- -- -- 
Southwest 0.06 0.0435 1.340 0.08 0.0191 0.900 0.07 0.0231 1.330 -- -- -- 
East Anglia 0.03 0.0848* 2.040 0.03 0.0555* 1.960 0.03 0.0612* 2.640 -- -- -- 
Midlands 0.13 0.0199 0.770 0.15 0.0114 0.630 0.14 0.0180 1.240 -- -- -- 
Yorkshires 0.07 0.0889* 2.840 0.08 0.0178 0.840 0.08 0.0367* 2.130 -- -- -- 
Wales 0.10 0.0486 1.350 0.11 0.0266 1.000 0.11 0.0291 1.370 -- -- -- 
Scotland 0.18 0.0092 0.320 0.12 0.0139 0.590 0.14 0.0185 1.040 -- -- -- 
Greater Manchester 0.03 0.0186 0.460 0.03 0.0265 0.880 0.03 0.0253 1.050 -- -- -- 
North 0.09 -0.0002 -0.010 0.11 0.0319 1.650 0.11 0.0210 1.350 -- -- -- 
LR chi2(39)=  1391.93  1785.25   3211.8    
Pseudo R2  0.0271  0.0185   0.021 LR chi2(1)= 107.06  
Number of Obs.  19223   39888   60818   70418  
1) UK CPI for obtaining real income figures in 1991. 
2) * = significant at 5%. 
3) Year dummies are jointly estimated. 
4) Null hypothesis: coefficient corresponding to explanatory variable is equal to zero. 
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Table 3 Financial Expectations Regression 
Dependent Variable = Fisitx (BHPS: 1991~2002) 
  Whole Sample  Male  Female  Married  Unmarried 
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. 
Decr_1 0.24 -0.2089* -19.460 0.23 -0.0950* -8.910 0.23 -0.0485* -4.520 0.24 -0.2426* -17.960 0.24 -0.1496* -8.410 
Same 0.47 - - 0.46 - - 0.48 - - 0.51 - - 0.43 - - 
Incr_1 0.29 0.3612* 32.410 0.31 0.3234* 31.380 0.30 0.3024* 29.210 0.25 0.4062* 28.710 0.33 0.2936* 16.150 
Age 44.88 -0.0413* -24.390 44.88 -0.0324* -20.830 43.81 -0.0347* -23.590 40.25 -0.0365* -12.890 40.25 -0.0509* -21.890 
AgeAge/100 23.63 0.0250* 14.580 23.63 0.0177* 10.550 22.90 0.0214* 13.640 20.81 0.0189* 6.670 20.81 0.0355* 15.230 
Household Income 71.95 -0.0311* -5.250 3.89 0.0043 0.910 3.64 0.0044 0.940 3.59 -0.0410* -5.350 3.59 -0.0113 -1.110 
Income Variance. - 0.0000* 8.600 - 0.0000* 8.350 - 0.0000* 3.920 - 0.0000* 6.850 - 0.0000* 5.160 
No married 0.46 - - 0.46 - - 0.52 - - -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Married 0.54 -0.0963* -7.290 0.54 -0.1294* -10.360 0.48 -0.1169* -9.680 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Male 0.50 - - -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.47 - - 0.47 - - 
Female 0.50 -0.0593* -6.250 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.53 -0.0623* -4.840 0.53 -0.0748* -4.940 
No Smoker 0.71 - - 0.71 - - 0.70 - - 0.66 - - 0.66 - - 
Smokers 0.29 0.0753* 7.330 0.29 0.0872* 9.180 0.30 0.0910* 9.520 0.34 0.0769* 5.720 0.34 0.0708* 4.410 
Housing Owned 0.24 - - 0.24   0.23 - - 0.21 - - 0.21 - - 
Housing Mortgage 0.48 0.0817* 6.520 0.48 0.0632* 5.160 0.47 0.0697* 5.690 0.40 0.0643* 3.960 0.40 0.0836* 4.070 
Housing Rented 0.28 0.0461* 3.460 0.28 0.0752* 5.840 0.30 0.0840* 6.690 0.39 0.0030 0.160 0.39 0.0763* 3.930 
Secondary Education 0.02 -0.0133 -0.430 0.02 0.0202 0.720 0.02 0.0607 1.930 0.02 -0.0051 -0.130 0.02 -0.0257 -0.490 
Higher Education 0.33 - - 0.33 - - 0.32 - - 0.48 - - 0.48 - - 
Others 0.65 -0.0120 -1.160 0.65 -0.0110 -1.180 0.67 0.0199* 2.040 0.63 0.0024 0.190 0.63 -0.0350* -2.050 
In Paid employed 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.54 - - 0.49 - - 0.49 - - 
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Self employment 0.08 0.2080* 12.440 0.08 0.1702* 10.800 0.05 0.1593* 8.150 0.05 0.1888* 9.570 0.05 0.2591* 8.100 
Unemployed 0.05 0.3618* 14.630 0.05 0.3436* 16.640 0.04 0.3853* 16.920 0.07 0.2106* 5.830 0.07 0.4838* 13.940 
Retired 0.21 -0.0919* -4.850 0.21 -0.1168* -5.850 0.21 -0.1716* -8.970 0.21 -0.0455 -1.930 0.21 -0.1551* -4.680 
Others 0.13 -0.2015* -11.170 0.13 -0.4362* -28.820 0.15 -0.3945* -27.350 0.19 -0.1064* -4.390 0.19 -0.2973* -10.780 
No Child 0.74 - - 0.74 - - 0.75 - - 0.88 - - 0.88 - - 
1 Child 0.11 -0.0007 -0.050 0.11 -0.0231 -1.620 0.11 -0.0073 -0.520 0.07 -0.0029 -0.160 0.07 -0.0106 -0.360 
2 Children 0.11 0.0652* 4.270 0.11 0.0412* 2.710 0.10 0.0875* 5.710 0.04 0.0792* 4.400 0.04 0.0242 0.670 
3+ Children 0.04 0.0092 0.410 0.04 -0.0129 -0.600 0.04 0.0192 0.840 0.01 0.0482 1.930 0.01 -0.1841* -2.820 
Small HH Size 0.17 -0.0379* -2.390 0.17 -0.1013* -6.570 0.18 -0.1243* -8.470 0.36 -0.0098 -0.130 0.36 -0.0806* -4.430 
Medium HH Size 0.53 - - 0.53 - - 0.51 - - 0.30 - - 0.30 - - 
Big HH Size 0.30 -0.0096 -0.870 0.30 -0.0427* -4.170 0.31 -0.0302* -2.900 0.34 0.0331* 2.410 0.34 -0.1132* -5.190 
London 0.08 -0.0306 -1.760 0.08 0.0174 0.940 0.07 0.0104 0.560 0.09 -0.0600* -2.610 0.09 -0.0107 -0.400 
Southeast 0.20 - - 0.20 - - 0.21 - - 0.15 - - 0.15 - - 
Southwest 0.07 -0.0277 -1.590 0.07 -0.0432* -2.390 0.06 0.0069 0.370 0.07 -0.0084 -0.390 0.07 -0.0653* -2.260 
East Anglia 0.03 -0.0829* -3.560 0.03 -0.0650* -2.570 0.03 -0.0469 -1.810 0.03 -0.0691* -2.440 0.03 -0.1150* -2.810 
Midlands 0.14 -0.0120 -0.820 0.14 0.0312* 2.130 0.13 0.0272 1.850 0.14 -0.0096 -0.530 0.14 -0.0183 -0.750 
Yorkshires 0.08 -0.0481* -2.800 0.08 -0.0408* -2.230 0.07 -0.0206 -1.130 0.07 -0.0430* -2.010 0.07 -0.0644* -2.230 
Wales 0.11 -0.0766* -3.640 0.11 -0.0063 -0.420 0.13 0.0089 0.600 0.11 -0.0190 -0.700 0.11 -0.1659* -4.930 
Scotland 0.14 0.0084 0.470 0.14 0.0459* 3.290 0.17 0.0643* 4.680 0.15 0.0358 1.570 0.15 -0.0308 -1.080 
Greater Manchester 0.03 -0.0302 -1.250 0.03 0.0298 1.150 0.03 0.0085 0.340 0.04 -0.0248 -0.790 0.04 -0.0437 -1.150 
North 0.11 -0.0320* -2.050 0.11 -0.0236 -1.470 0.09 -0.0269 -1.660 0.10 -0.0167 -0.850 0.10 -0.0644* -2.470 
LR chi2(42)=  11468.7 LR chi2(41)= 12491.13   11977.78   5958.89   5402.25  
Pseudo R2  0.0854   0.0835   0.0814   0.0724   0.1048  
Number of Obs.  72921   79895   80674   45383   27558  
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Dependent Variable = Fisitx (BHPS: 1991~2002)  
  Secondary Edu.  High Education  Others 
Probit Model Mean Coef T-Stat. Mean Coef. T-Stat. Mean. Coef. T-Stat. 
Decr_1 0.25 -0.010 -0.510 0.24 -0.3159* -24.150 0.20 0.15 1.82 
Same 0.39 - - 0.52 - - 0.40 - - 
Incr_1 0.36 0.337* 18.230 0.25 0.4001* 27.810 0.40 0.3502* 4.920 
Age 38.04 -0.0257* -7.380 48.17 -0.0492* -23.850 44.88 -0.0330* -2.030 
AgeAge/100 16.75 0.0103* 2.690 26.99 0.0315* 15.630 23.63 0.0236 1.400 
Household Income 4.12 -0.0693* -6.850 3.67 -0.0024 -0.310 3.84 -0.1048* -2.690 
Income Variance. - 0.0000* 6.240 - 0.0000* 7.520 - 0.0000 -0.400 
No married 0.49 - - 0.45 - - 0.46 - - 
Married 0.51 -0.1168* -5.100 0.55 -0.0761* -4.570 0.54 -0.1113 -1.210 
Male 0.57 - - 0.48 - - 0.50 - - 
Female 0.43 -0.1296* -7.960 0.52 -0.0099 -0.820 0.50 -0.1164 -1.740 
No Smoker 0.76 - - 0.68 - - 0.71 - - 
Smokers 0.24 0.0870* 4.450 0.32 0.0711* 5.790 0.29 0.1760 1.590 
Housing Owned 0.19 - - 0.27 - - 0.24 - - 
Housing Mortgage 0.60 0.1015* 4.290 0.42 0.0790* 5.150 0.48 0.3513* 3.480 
Housing Rented 0.21 0.1630* 5.520 0.32 0.0167 1.090 0.28 0.4007* 3.060 
Secondary Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Higher Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Others -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
In Paid employed 0.66 - - 0.48 - - 0.54 - - 
Self employment 0.09 0.1688* 6.250 0.07 0.2123* 9.680 0.08 0.2609* 2.290 
Unemployed 0.03 0.5330* 10.760 0.05 0.3313* 11.320 0.05 0.8091* 3.240 
Retired 0.09 0.0365 0.890 0.27 -0.0964* -4.380 0.21 -0.1529 -0.860 
Others 0.13 -0.3466* -10.080 0.13 -0.1376* -6.320 0.13 -0.0857 -0.550 
No Child 0.71 - - 0.76 - - 0.74 - - 
1 Child 0.13 -0.0588* -2.430 0.10 0.0298 1.560 0.11 -0.0973 -1.100 
2 Children 0.12 0.0377 1.530 0.10 0.0761* 3.730 0.11 -0.0362 -0.360 
3+ Children 0.04 0.0256 0.650 0.04 -0.0231 -0.820 0.04 0.2822 1.830 
Small HH Size 0.14 -0.0501 -1.800 0.18 -0.0393* -1.970 0.17 0.0234 0.220 
Medium HH Size 0.56 - - 0.51 - - 0.53 - - 
Big HH Size 0.30 -0.0302 -1.540 0.30 0.0020 0.150 0.30 -0.1798* -2.080 
London 0.09 -0.0371 -1.270 0.07 -0.0235 -1.040 0.08 -0.1470 -1.500 
Southeast 0.21 - - 0.20 - - 0.20 - - 
Southwest 0.06 -0.0671* -2.080 0.08 -0.0131 -0.620 0.07 0.2388 1.870 
East Anglia 0.03 -0.1227* -2.950 0.03 -0.0510 -1.790 0.03 0.0727 0.230 
Midlands 0.13 -0.0178 -0.690 0.15 0.0061 0.340 0.14 -0.1250 -1.200 
Yorkshires 0.07 -0.0971* -3.110 0.08 -0.0099 -0.470 0.08 -0.1389 -1.260 
Wales 0.10 -0.0812* -2.250 0.11 -0.0747* -2.840 0.11 0.0881 0.340 
 39 
Scotland 0.18 0.0016 0.060 0.12 0.0387 1.650 0.14 -0.1085 -1.020 
Greater Manchester 0.03 -0.0827* -2.020 0.03 0.0128 0.430 0.03 -0.1327 -0.530 
North 0.09 -0.0328 -1.160 0.11 -0.0235 -1.220 0.11 -0.0545 -0.430 
LR chi2(40)=  2700.84   8606.52   219.6  
Pseudo R2  0.062   0.099   0.075  
Number of Obs.  22719   8606.52   1522  
1) UK CPI for obtaining real income figures in 1991. 
2) * = significant at 5%. 
3) Year dummies are jointly estimated.  
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